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BLUE RACING: THE RACIALIZATION OF POLICE IN HATE CRIME
STATUTES
Christopher Williams*
ABSTRACT
Content warning: this Article discusses police brutality.
The relationship between race, law, and policing is one that has been analyzed by
many scholars throughout U.S. history. The vast majority of research about police has
highlighted policing in relation to groups they police, focusing on areas such as policing
practices, policies, or involvement in the racialization of minority groups. This
scholarship has far outpaced research on actions taken by law enforcement on behalf of
law enforcement— specifically, how law enforcement engages in racialization out of
self-interest. A better understanding of the ways in which law enforcement engages in
racialization that is not just limited to other groups would provide a new way for
understanding race, law, and policing. In addition, such an understanding would
provide the appropriate context for policies and laws birthed out of the police
racialization process.
In this Article, I explore the racialization process of police by police (“blue racing”) in
the context of hate crime legislation. I argue that the passage of hate crime legislation
that included law enforcement, which I will refer to as “blue lives matter bills,” was not
the result of increased violence or threats to officer safety, despite the rationale offered
by the bills’ proponents. Instead, utilizing both Zakiya Luna’s “racial framing” and
Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s “racial project” concepts, I argue that including
law enforcement as a protected category within hate crime statutes was part of a racial
project, engaged in by the countermovement blue lives matter, to prevent and
criminalize protests that called attention to law enforcement abuse. Essential to this
racial project was the blue racing of police. In this way, blue lives matter bill
proponents used racial framing to legitimize their claims of alleged oppression. This
legitimization gave both the blue lives matter bill proponents and legislatures the cover
to punish and reprimand protestors of law enforcement brutality.
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INTRODUCTION
When one reflects on the 2010s, it will be hard to make the case that
the visibility of police killings and the racial discourse surrounding
policing was not a defining characteristic of the decade. The unarmed
murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Laquan McDonald, Alton
Sterling, Freddie Gray, Eric Garner, Tanisha Anderson, Rekia Boyd, and
Sandra Bland sparked protests and social discourse that spanned the
decade. The 2020s are shaping up to be no different, as the recent highprofile shootings of Tony McDade, Jacob Blake, Adam Toledo, Breonna
Taylor, Daunte Wright, and George Floyd have once again propelled law
enforcement into the national spotlight.
Throughout U.S. history, many scholars have analyzed the
relationship between race, law, and policing. The vast majority of
research about policing has highlighted its relation to groups they
police, focusing largely on practices, policies, or involvement in the
racialization of minority groups. This scholarship has far outpaced
research on self-serving actions by law enforcement—specifically, its
self-interested racialization. A better grasp on the ways in which law
enforcement racializes itself would provide a new lens for
understanding race, law, and policing. Additionally, such an
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understanding would provide the appropriate context for policies and
laws that are birthed out of police racialization.
To grasp how law enforcement uses racial categorization, I explore
the racializing of police by police (“blue racing”) in the context of hate
crime legislation. I argue that the passage of hate crime legislation that
includes law enforcement, which I will refer to as “blue lives matter
bills,” was not the result of increased violence or threats to officer
safety, despite the rationale put forth by bill proponents. Instead,
utilizing both Zakiya Luna’s “racial framing” and Michael Omi and
Howard Winant’s “racial project” concepts, I argue that the inclusion of
law enforcement as a protected category within hate crime statutes was
a part of a racial project, engaged in by the “blue lives matter”
countermovement, to prevent and criminalize protests that called
attention to law enforcement abuse. Essential to this racial project was
the blue racing of police. In this way, blue lives matter bill proponents
used racial framing as a way to legitimize their claims of alleged
oppression. This legitimization gave both the blue lives matter
movement and legislatures the authority to punish and reprimand
protestors under the guise of justice.
Blue lives matter bill proponents accomplished this maneuver by
engaging in a racial project that framed law enforcement as racialized
victims of oppression, in contrast to the Black Lives Matter movement
and victims of police brutality. In essence, by using racial framing,
proponents of blue lives matter bills could claim that they were
protecting an oppressed group, rather than punishing or retaliating
against protestors of police brutality. Racialization proved vital for blue
lives matter bill proponents in achieving additional protections for
policing, while also legally restricting the ability to mobilize against
police.
“Blue racing” describes the process by which blue lives matter bill
proponents racialized police officers to pass hate crime legislation. To
be clear, I am not suggesting that law enforcement or blue lives matter
bill proponents successfully created or intended to create a long-term
racial identity. Instead, I argue that blue lives matter bill proponents
engaged in a process of racialization that ultimately led to the passage
of blue lives matter bills. By better understanding this process, we can
better understand how law enforcement engages in racialization and
racial projects. In this particular context, we can also recognize the
limits of hate crime legislation.
I also suggest that scholars explore more nontraditional contexts
where racialization might occur. Looking in traditional places limits
our understanding of how racialization is arising and, more
importantly, fails to adequately capture how police racialization
garners legal protections at the expense of communities of color.
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I first begin by providing overviews of the relationship between
policing, law, and racialization. Afterwards, I provide context for hate
crime laws. Next, I describe the methodology used for this research. I
then present findings on blue racing. This Section of the Article not
only describes blue racing, but also analyzes the claims made by blue
lives matter bill proponents. The latter is crucial to understanding the
true intention behind the push for police to be included in hate crime
legislation. Lastly, I conclude by discussing the implications for blue
racing and what can be learned from policing engagement in
racialization.
I. RACIAL PROJECTS: RACIALIZATION, POLICING, AND THE LAW
To help explain the racial project engaged in by blue lives matter bill
proponents, I use sociologists Omi and Winant’s and fellow race
scholar Michael L. Walker’s concept of “racial project.” 1 Racial projects
“are attempts to create meaning structures around racial categories
and simultaneously organize resources according to those categories.” 2
I also draw heavily upon sociologist Zakiya Luna’s concept of racial
framing, which “involves the purposeful deploying of race and racial
arguments in framing processes.” 3 Racial framing includes multiple
stages, such as recruiting, explaining why an issue matters, and
describing of the community affected by the issue. 4 In this way, racial
formation can be viewed as the product of a racial project, and racial
frames can best be understood as the ideology or arguments used in
support of a racial project.
Common scholarship in the area of racialization and the law tends
to focus on the process by which groups within the United States have
engaged in racial projects to help create new racial categories. 5
Sociologists G. Cristina Mora and Dina Okamato and law professor
Laura Gomez detail how the categories of latine 6 and hispanic 7

1. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); see also Michael L. Walker, Race Making in a Penal Institution, 121 AM.
J. SOCIO. 1051, 1052 (2016).
2. Walker, supra note 1, at 1053.
3. Zakiya Luna, “Black Children Are an Endangered Species”: Examining Racial Framing in Social
Movements, 51 SOCIO. FOCUS 238, 239 (2018).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., LAURA E. GÓMEZ, INVENTING LATINOS: A NEW STORY OF AMERICAN RACISM 140–50,
152–59 (2020); G. Cristina Mora & Dina Okamoto, Boundary Articulation and Emergent Identities: Asian
and Hispanic Panethnicity in Comparison 1970–1980, 67 SOC. PROBS. 56, 60–61, 69–73 (2020) (exploring
the creation of Asian and Hispanic panethnic movements).
6. Currently there is riveting debate about whether to use latinx or latine to describe a
gender-neutral identity. To be clear, both do. However, within the debate there has been concern
raised that the “x” in latinx doesn’t gel well with traditional Spanish syntax like the “e” does in
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emerged after much political mobilization from both state and
community activists seeking racial recognition from the U.S.
government as underrepresented, oppressed minorities in wake of the
Civil Rights Movement. 8 Mora and Okamoto help extend this logic to
the asian racial category as well. 9 Though various community actors
actively advocated and engaged in racialization projects for the creation
of racial categories such as latine, hispanic, and asian, it is crucial to
understand that such proponents embarked on racialization projects
out of necessity. In the absence of advocating for racialization,
individuals now recognized as latine, hispanic, and asian ran the risk of
being rendered invisible by the U.S. government’s system of allocating
resources based on race.
Of particular importance to this project is the research depicting
how police engage in racialization. Scholarship in this area has focused
primarily on actions taken by law enforcement that contribute to the
racialization of other groups. Tremendous research has shown the
myriad ways in which law enforcement engages in discriminatory
policing practices in minority communities throughout the United
States. 10 These practices include illegal chokeholds, disproportionate
drug enforcement arrests, stops and frisks, and vagrancy law
enforcement, amongst others. 11 Far from coincidental, the
discriminatory nature of policing is intentional. As sociologist Julian Go
notes, many of the methods and police practices that shape policing
today are the direct result of police officials’ efforts to “manage

latine. As such, I have made the deliberate choice to use latin(e) as a descriptor throughout this
Article to be as inclusive as possible. For more in-depth insight into this debate, see Catalina
(Kathleen) M. de Onís, What’s in an “x”?: An Exchange About the Politics of “Latinx,” 1 Chiricú J.:
Latina/o Literatures, Arts & Cultures 78, 86–87 (2017).
7. I have made the deliberate political choice to place in lower case all references to race and
ethnicities. I have purposely decided to break the spelling convention surrounding race and
ethnicity throughout as a constant reminder of the social construction of race and ethnicity.
Furthermore, this political move reinforces the fact that there is in fact no proper way to “do” race.
8. See GOMEZ, supra note 5; Mora & Okamoto, supra note 5.
9. See Mora & Okamoto, supra note 5.
10. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Stop-and-Strip Violence: The Doctrinal Migrations of
Reasonable Suspicion, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 467, 486–89(2020) (noting the discriminatory
manner in which police deploy stop and frisk); Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 650, 698 (2020) (highlighting how police enforce racial segregation through racist policing
practices such as discriminatory vagrancy enforcement); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING
BLACK MEN 3–6 (2017) (discussing metaphoric and literal illegal uses of police chokeholds on black
men); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE ERA OF COLOR
BLINDNESS 97–106 (2010) (highlighting disproportionate drug arrests of black individuals);
ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 317–23 (2016) (chronicling the War on Drugs’ disparate impact on black
individuals).
11. See sources cited supra note 10.
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perceived threats to social order from racialized minority populations”
during the twentieth century. 12
Scholar Ian F. Haney López emphasizes that the state has always
played an active role in constructing race and that, in essence, serves as
a mechanism to reflect and solidify racial prejudice. 13 Furthermore,
scholars note that the state engages in racialization projects that create
and reproduce race through law and policy. 14 Historian Khalil
Muhammad’s work reminds us that law enforcement has always been
vital to the racialization of criminality and specifically to the association
of blackness with criminality. 15 Sociologists Karen Fields and Barbara
Fields refer to the conflation of criminality and blackness as “racecraft,”
whereby law enforcement practices help ascribe racial boundaries and
meanings onto groups. 16 The state in this sense does not just reflect
society, but actively creates and reproduces racial categories,
oftentimes using law enforcement to enforce its racialization
schemes. 17
Racialization can occur through law enforcement, creating
racialized space and restricting movement outside that space for a
particular racialized community. 18 Prominent policing scholar Nikki
Jones highlights how within poor, hyper-policed communities, routine
law enforcement encounters follow a particularized set of racedependent codes. 19 Police harassment and contact become so
commonplace in hyper-policed communities of color that residents
begin to conform to a certain set of behaviors and routines in an
attempt to avoid police, even when they are not engaging in illegal
activity. 20 This is because the consequences of not conforming to the
code of interaction can mean unwanted and unwarranted violent
12. Julian Go, Imperial Origins of American Policing: Militarization and Imperial Feedback in the
Early 20th Century, 125 AM. J. SOCIO. 1193, 1197 (2020).
13. See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–37 (1994).
14. See id.; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1745–76 (1993);
Jennifer Chacón & Susan Bibler Coutin, Racialization Through Enforcement, in RACE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING 159–74 (2018).
15. See KHALIL MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 12, 197, 269–77 (2019).
16. See KAREN FIELDS & BARBARA FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN
LIFE 26–29 (2012).
17. See Deenesh Sohoni, Unsuitable Suitors: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Naturalization Laws, and the
Construction of Asian Identities, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 587, 612–15 (2007).
18. See RASHAD SHABAZZ, SPATIALIZING BLACKNESS: ARCHITECTURES OF CONFINEMENT AND
BLACK MASCULINITY IN CHICAGO 98–99, 101–08 (Darlene Clark Hine & Dwight A. McBride eds.,
2015).
19. See Nikki Jones, “The Regular Routine”: Proactive Policing and Adolescent Development Among
Young, Poor Black Men, in PATHWAYS TO ADULTHOOD FOR DISCONNECTED YOUNG MEN IN LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES 33–54 (2014).
20. See Forrest Stuart, Becoming “Copwise”: Policing, Culture, and the Collateral Consequences of
Street-Level Criminalization, 50 L. & SOC. REV. 279, 299–300 (2016).
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contact with police. 21 Racialized law enforcement codes of interaction
and surveillance of racialized minority communities convey what
Professors Joe Soss and Velsa Weaver describe as lessons on who
deserves fairness and justice. 22 Such lessons are often taught through
fines, arrests, and criminal records which prohibit racialized minority
communities from escaping poverty and frequently result in having
rights stripped away by the state. 23 In essence, law enforcement actions
ascribe racial meaning, conveying the false notion that racial
communities are criminal, need to be punished, and are undeserving of
equality.
Scholars have also pointed out law enforcement’s racializing impact
in immigration law and in prisons. Law professors Jennifer Chacón and
Susan Bibler Coutin and sociologist Tanya Golash-Boza show how
immigration courts and immigration law enforcement agents have
historically and contemporarily racialized immigrants both by
codifying their exclusion from whiteness and by profiling on the basis
of racist stereotypes. 24 Arrests and subsequent deportations prove
extremely important in legitimizing racial categories and citizenry.
Law professor Monica Bell points out that “border patrol”—Bell’s term
for the practice of excluding non-white people from “white spaces”—is
specifically a state-organized racialization project. 25 Within jails,
Walker highlights the active role that prison law enforcement officials
play in racialization projects that reinforce segregation of inmates
based on race. 26 The importance of enforcing racial boundaries is so
great that corrections officers rely on them to conduct their job
successfully. 27 Walker notes that corrections officers facilitate
communication and discipline through leaders picked by race. 28 These
leaders handle the affairs of their racialized group with the blessing of
officers and act as mediators between fellow inmates and officers. 29
This arrangement reduces the workload for officers and shifts labor
21. Id.
22. Joe Soss & Velsa Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing
of Race-Class Subjugated Communities, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 565, 579 (2017); see also I. Bennett
Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011).
23. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1323–27 (2012); see also
REUBEN JONATHAN MILLER, HALFWAY HOME: RACE, PUNISHMENT, AND THE AFTERLIFE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 23–193, 237–72 (1st ed. 2021).
24. See Chacón & Bibler Coutin, supra note 14; Tanya Golash-Boza, Raced and Gendered Logics of
Immigration Law Enforcement in the United States, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION
CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING (Mary Bosworth, Alpa Parmar & Yolanda
Vázquez, eds., 2018).
25. Bell, supra note 10, at 697–701.
26. See Walker, supra note 1.
27. See id. at 1067–69, 1074.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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responsibilities onto inmates. 30 Instead of resolving disputes, deputies
may simply refer an inmate to their race leader. 31
Scholarship on the racialization of law enforcement itself remains
far less developed. This is because there have likely been relatively few
times where the specific position of law enforcement officer has been
racialized. I add to the race, law, and policing literature by departing
from the focus on law enforcement’s racializing of other groups and
instead focusing on its self-racialization. Doing so reveals how racial
recognition projects extend not only to whiteness, but also in this case
to “blueness” as a way to uphold white supremacist structures of
policing. This Article highlights the need to study law enforcement
actions not just as militarized forces in communities of color, but as
actors engaged in lobbying efforts utilizing racial projects and
processes. To fully grasp law enforcement’s engagement with
racialization, we must also consider how it uses racialization to advance
its own legal interests.
II. BLUE RACING
Blue racing can be best understood as the process that blue lives
matter bill proponents undertook to racialize the employment position
of police officers. The first part of the process entailed the creation of
the blue lives matter movement itself. The second part entailed creating
the racial framing that would rationalize depicting law enforcement as
a racialized blue identity. This ordering does not suggest that one
process came before the other. Rather, it delineates two separate parts
of the process. In reality, the racialized blue framing and the creation of
the blue lives matter movement happened in tandem with each other.
In contrast, the third part of the process came well after the creation of
the blue lives matter movement and its racialized framing. This third
component entailed legislating the racialized frame, including
introducing and successfully passing blue lives matter bills.
A. Creating the Blue Lives Matter Movement
Blue lives matter was founded in December 2014 by three members
of law enforcement, Joseph Imperatrice, Christopher Brinkley, and
Carlos Delgado, in response to the killing of Rafael Ramos and Wenjian

30.
31.

Id.
Id.
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Liu. 32 The movement was premised on a perception of increased threat
to police and of public misunderstanding of what it takes to be a law
enforcement officer. 33 According to blue lives matter’s largest Facebook
page (with over two million amassed followers), the movement’s
genesis is also tied to Michael Brown’s death, which they refer to as the
“incident in Ferguson.” 34 This, of course, makes sense as Michael
Brown’s death propelled Black Lives Matter and nationwide protests of
police brutality into the nationwide spotlight. 35
While Black Lives Matter may not have eradicated police brutality,
the movement organized nationwide protests and garnered massive
attention from news media. 36 Blue lives matter interpreted the
nationwide attention and protests placing scrutiny on law enforcement
not as a moment for rethinking policing but as threats and
misinformation about law enforcement. 37 As Black Lives Matter
blossomed on the national stage, blue lives matter emerged as a
countermovement seeking to discredit Black Lives Matter’s calls to end
racist and violent police practices.

32. Christopher Berg, Introducing the Police Tribune, POLICE TRIB. (June 10, 2020), https://
policetribune.com/introducing-the-police-tribune/ [https://perma.cc/685Z-ZMUG]; Executive Board, BLUE
LIVES MATTER N.Y.C., https://bluelivesmatternyc.org/pages/executive-board [https://perma.cc/D5W6LS23].
33. See History, BLUE LIVES MATTER, https://archive.bluelivesmatter.blue/organization
/#history [https://perma.cc/3W4Y-NEPU].
34. Blue Lives Matter (@bluematters), About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg
/bluematters/about/?ref=page_internal (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
35. See Josh Hafner, How Michael Brown’s Death, Two Years Ago, Pushed #BlackLivesMatter into a
Movement, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2016, 7:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now
/2016/08/08/how-michael-browns-death-two-years-ago-pushed-blacklivesmatter-into-movement
/88424366/ [https://perma.cc/BL95-X63N].
36. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Black Lives Matter: Birth of a Movement, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2017,
1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/17/black-lives-matter-birth-of-amovement [https://perma.cc/FFH9-ADL9]; What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-afterpolice-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/T2Y8-WUW3]; German Lopez, What Were the 2014 Ferguson
Protests About?, VOX (Jan. 27, 2016, 6:19 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/5/31/17937764/fergusonmissouri-protests-2014-michael-brown-police-shooting [https://perma.cc/862S-PL58]; Rheana
Murray, People Walk out of Work, School in Ferguson Protests, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2014, 4:59 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/people-walk-work-school-ferguson-protests/story?id=27288450
[https://perma.cc/H3JC-R4VC]; Javonte Anderson, George Floyd Fallout: Lightfoot Lifts Chicago Curfew;
Peaceful Protestors March Through South Side Police Neighborhoods; Hundreds Rally for Reform in
Evanston, CHI. TRIB. (June 7, 2020, 5:53 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ctgeorge-floyd-chicago-protests-20200606-ee4mdvafvbfhfcpr7lrzfayypu-story.html [https://perma.cc
/38H6-BP4C]; Renee Lewis, Protestors Demand Answers in Sandra Bland’s Death in Texas Jail, ALJAZEERA
AM. (July 17, 2015 7:45 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/17/protesters-demandanswers-on-death-of-sandra-bland.html [https://perma.cc/D8FG-A763].
37. See BLUE LIVES MATTER, supra note 33; Berg, supra note 32.
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B. The Blue Frame: Co-opting Black Lives Matter
The creation of the “blue” frame proved essential to the eventual
codification of police officers as a protected group under hate crime
statutes. Scholar David Snow defines “frames” as interpretive lenses
that help individuals categorize and perceive experiences within their
life and space in the world. 38 Frames “render events or occurrences
meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide
action.”39 Opposing groups, such as a social movement and its
countermovement, can utilize the same frame yet deploy different
ideologies. 40
Since its inception, Black Lives Matter has embraced a frame that
emphasizes law enforcement and police in the U.S. as racist
institutions which target black americans. 41 Combining Snow and
Luna’s framing concepts, we can understand the “blue” frame as a cooptation of Black Lives Matter’s use of race as a powerful frame to
explain oppression and violence at the hands of law enforcement.42
Blue lives matter did this by constructing and using “blue” as a stand in
racialized identity akin to the usage of “black” for Black Lives Matter.
For blue lives matter, “blue” signifies the identity of a person who is a
police officer. 43 The blue frame undermines the validity of Black Lives
Matter’s claim that black citizens are victims of systemic racism and
violence at the hands of the police. Through this lens, blue victims
appear to be the true victims of societal oppression, not black citizens.
Though a voluntary employment choice, “police officer” amounts to
a racial identity under the blue frame. The most apparent evidence is
that some within the movement have adopted the term “blue racism.”44
Blue racism as defined by the Sergeants Benevolent Association (a New
York City sergeants’ union) is a “‘strange form of racism’ that ‘continues
to engulf the country,’” whereby police officers are seen through a more

38. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movement: An Overview
and Assessments, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 611, 614 (2000).
39. Id.
40. Luna, supra note 3 (illustrating that the social movement here would be Black Lives Matter
and the countermovement would be blue lives matter).
41. See 8 Years Strong, BLACK LIVES MATTER (July 13, 2021), https://blacklivesmatter.com/sixyears-strong/ [https://perma.cc/842R-EX25].
42. See Luna, supra note 3; Benford & Snow, supra note 38.
43. See Sarah Jorgensen, NYPD Sergeants’ Union Calls out ‘Blue Racism’ in Controversial Video,
CNN (Aug. 23, 2017, 7:55 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/22/us/nypd-union-blue-racism-video
[https://perma.cc/4JCL-8APG] (noting the Sergeants Benevolent Association president Ed Mullins’
comments to CNN where he references police officers as having literal blue skin).
44. Id.; NYPD Sergeants Benevolent Association, Blue Racism, YOUTUBE (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8IjjdBNfhW0 [https://perma.cc/P8NF-AN6B]; Alan Feuer, Police Union Complains of
‘Blue Racism,’ Then Regrets Word Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22
/nyregion/nypd-union-video-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/GU4S-AFSG].
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racist lens than individuals who are black, latine, asian, or white.45 In
this way, blue racism positions officers as a racialized minority, or a
subordinate status group, which transcends the officer’s own race yet
still encapsulates them in a new socially constructed racial category:
“blue.”
Whereas Black Lives Matter’s race frame characterized Michael
Brown’s death as an unwarranted killing of an unarmed black teenager,
blue lives matter’s blue frame posited the same event as a necessary
action undertaken by officer Darren Wilson to protect himself. 46
Further, blue lives matter’s blue frame characterizes Black Lives Matter
as agitators and liars who disseminate distortions about Darren Wilson
and all other officers, rather than as protestors and activists who
advocate for police reform and the end of racialized police violence.47
For blue lives matter, Black Lives Matter and other protestors fail to
consider personal accountability and instead seek to blame the
government and police. 48 These claims are intended to minimize and
obfuscate the problem of racist policing while simultaneously
attempting to undermine concerns about police reform raised directly
by Black Lives Matter.
In the wake of Black Lives Matter calling for reform, blues lives
matter supporters have called such demands unwarranted as part of a
general war on cops. 49 Specifically, accusations of institutional racism
and misconduct are said to make policing unsafe for officers. 50 Blue
lives matter’s national spokesman explicitly articulated this position:
“But when the entire profession gets painted with a broad
brush of accusations of institutionalized racism, brutality, and
widespread misconduct, it destroys the morale and causes
much added physical, emotional, and psychological danger to
an already dangerous profession.”51

45. Feuer, supra note 44.
46. See Christopher Berg, About Blue Lives Matter, POLICE TRIB. (June 6, 2018),
https://policetribune.com/?s=about+blue+lives+matter [https://perma.cc/6URD-3WK6].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK ON LAW AND ORDER
MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE, 1–4 (2016); Fox News, Disturbing New Video Shows War on Cops Is Real,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeHzZ561CFc [https://perma.cc/G6Y45KNF]; Fox News, Newt Gingrich: There’s a War on Cops Nobody Wants to Talk About, YOUTUBE (Apr. 14,
2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=grAe7q2wgJg [https://perma.cc/6FVR-6S27]; Fox Business,
Sheriff Arpaio: This Is a War on Cops, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CcU
_—utAI [https://perma.cc/95S7-AFUT]; Fox News, Tomi Lahren: The War on Cops Is Real, It’s Not Over,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXVTWFJ5GGs [https://perma.cc
/2PQV-GWZD].
50. See sources cited supra note 49.
51. See Berg, supra note 46.
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Another application of this blue frame can be seen in the
movement’s name. The movement replaced black with blue to signal
solidarity with police, who were targets of critique from Black Lives
Matter. The move to replace black with blue isn’t trivial. The black in
Black Lives Matter was intentionally selected by its founders to call
attention to the plight faced specifically by black americans at the
hands of police. 52 The importance and intentionality of the black-raced
identity can be found in Black Lives Matter’s founding narrative:
#BlackLivesMatter was founded in 2013 in response to the
acquittal of Trayvon Martin’s murderer. Black Lives Matter
Global Network Foundation, Inc. is a global organization in the
US, UK, and Canada, whose mission is to eradicate white
supremacy and build local power to intervene in violence
inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes. By
combating and countering acts of violence, creating space for
Black imagination and innovation, and centering Black joy, we
are winning immediate improvements in our lives. 53
In this way, the “black” in Black Lives Matter is inextricably tied to and
anchored in a racial framework. This renders any co-optation of this
framing as inseparable from a racialized framework.
I posit that adopting this racial framing allowed blue lives matter
and its proponents to recognize both their movement and blue lives
matter bills through a familiar lens, not that movement leaders actually
believed blue was a racial identity. Using blue as a racial frame, then,
can be best understood as a disposable tool by the movement. Unlike
other groups that have moved to create a consolidated racial category,
such as hispanic or asian, by advocating for inclusion on the census or
mobilizing political campaigns for recognition,54 blue lives matter has
shown little interest in legitimately institutionalizing “blue” as a racial
identity outside of its attempts to discredit any claims made by Black
Lives Matter.
Through this oppositional race frame, legislatures birthed bills
incorporating officers into hate crime statutes. By co-opting Black Lives
Matter’s racial framing, blue lives matter posits officers, or the “blue”

52. See 8 Years Strong, supra note 41; Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed [https://perma.cc
/K3VW-4Q7N].
53. About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/X4U3TB4K].
54. See G. CRISTINA MORA, MAKING HISPANICS: HOW ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND MEDIA
CONSTRUCTED A NEW AMERICAN 83–119 (2014); see also ERIKA LEE, THE MAKING OF ASIAN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 283–313 (2015).
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identity, as oppressed victims of targeted discrimination, prejudice,
and violence in need of protection.
III. LEGISLATING THE BLUE-ING OF HATE CRIMES
A. Understanding Hate Crime Statutes
The primary purpose of hate crime statutes in the United States is
to prevent bias-motivated crimes against designated groups. 55 The first
modern hate crime statute was introduced as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968. 56 Statutes prohibiting bias-motivated crimes or actions
existed beforehand, but none are akin to the modern hate crime
statutes in place today. 57 The 1968 statute was specifically designed to
enable the federal government to combat racially-motivated crimes that
inhibited the exercise of civil rights by other U.S. citizens.58 In
particular, the law focused on those crimes perpetrated against
racialized minorities. Race was a key category that Congress wanted to
protect. 59 But in thinking about race, the U.S. Senate envisioned not
only black americans, but also white americans who were victimized by
bias-motivated crimes as a result of aiding black americans in the Civil
Rights Era. 60 While Congress did not envision limiting statutory
protections to black americans, it is clear that the impetus to create the
1968 statute was to curb violent attacks that targeted black americans. 61
To bring a claim under the 1968 statute, the victim must show that
the offender chose the victim because of their membership in one of the
protected classes under the statute and because of the victim’s
engagement in a protected activity. 62 The 1968 statute classifies victims
as all individuals targeted based on “race, color, religion, or national
origin.” 63 “Victims” is defined broadly, such that no one racial or
religious group is excluded. 64 “Federally protected activities” under the
statute include enjoying any benefit or service administered by any
state, participating in jury duty, attending public school or college,

55. Hate Crime Laws, DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt/hate-crimelaws [https://perma.cc/ZDW9-LEYS] [hereinafter Hate Crime Laws].
56. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 245.
57. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Subverting Symbolism: The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act and Cooperative Federalism, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1863, 1876–78 (2012).
58. Id. at 1878.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1878; § 245(b)(2).
63. § 245(b)(2).
64. Simmons, supra note 57, at 1878; § 245(b)(2).
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applying for or enjoying employment, traveling, and engaging in
commerce. 65
The act itself has glaring flaws. While it protected categories like
race and religion, it did not protect categories like gender, disability, or
sexual orientation.66 This meant that if an individual targeted a woman
or someone based on their sexual orientation, their conduct would not
constitute a hate crime motivated by bias under the statue. 67 Likewise,
only activities listed under the statute were protected. If someone
targeted a black individual because they were black and committed a
crime against them that was not listed in the statute, it would not
qualify as a hate crime. This has led critics of the statute, like former
Attorney General of the United States Eric Holder, to comment that the
jurisdictional requirements are too onerous for prosecution. 68 In light
of the many unprotected groups who are likely to be victims of hate
crimes, and the many ways in which one can carry out a bias-motivated
attack without being in violation of the law, the law seemed to fall short
of actually capturing and preventing bias-motivated attacks.
The next federal action addressing hate crime statutes was the Hate
Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 69 which primarily served to collect statistics
related to hate crimes. 70 Just four years later, Congress passed the Hate
Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, providing for increased
punishment of hate crimes when “the defendant intentionally selects a
victim . . . because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of
any person.” 71 While this act added increased penalties for hate crimes,
it still didn’t solve the onerous jurisdictional requirements, nor did it
expand the protected categories from the underlying 1968 statute. 72
Therefore, the statistics and enhancements still fell short of capturing
bias-motivated attacks.
The most recent enactment of hate crime legislation on the federal
level came in 2009 with the Shepard and Byrd Hate Crime Prevention

65. § 245(b)(2).
66. See id.
67. See Hate Crime Laws, supra note 55 (noting that gender and sexuality were not protected
under Hate Crime statutes until the Shepard and Byrd Hate Crimes Act).
68. Simmons, supra note 57, at 1879; see also Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic
Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1238–42 (2000).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 534.
70. Simmons, supra note 57, at 1880.
71. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003(a),
108 Stat. 2096 (1994); Sara K. Rankin, Invidious Deliberation: The Problem of Congressional Bias in
Federal Hate Crime Legislation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 571 n.28 (2014).
72. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 280003; Simmons, supra note 57, at
1881 (“[I]f a victim was attacked because of her sexual orientation, gender, or disability, § 245 did
not apply, and there was no penalty enhancement available for a defendant who chose her victim
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.”).
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Act. 73 This act sought to remedy the shortcomings of the 1968 statute by
expanding the category of protected groups to include gender,
disability, and sexual orientation.74 Furthermore, it removes the
onerous requirement that individuals themselves must have been
engaging in a particular type of activity to get protection under the act.
The act does not, however, allow the federal government to simply
exercise unfettered jurisdiction. Instead, the Shepard and Byrd Hate
Crime Prevention Act allows the federal government to exercise
jurisdiction only when (1) a hate crime has occurred in a state without a
hate crime statue, (2) a state asks for federal intervention, (3) a federal
interest is still present after a state prosecution, or (4) federal
prosecution is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial
justice. 75
In short, the hate crime legislative landscape is complicated. While
initially birthed to protect black americans, and to some degree white
americans who fought for black americans’ civil rights, the 1968
statute’s shortcomings outweighed its utility. By failing to protect
gender, disability, or sexual orientation, the act left out many victims of
bias-motivated crimes from protection at the federal level, particularly
given the statute’s already-onerous jurisdictional requirements for
prosecution. While much has changed, and hate crime categories have
expanded to become more inclusive, hate crime legislation has not
protected vulnerable groups comprehensively at the federal level.
States can include or exclude whichever categories they see fit, and
determine whatever jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied for
hate crimes within their jurisdiction. 76 Moreover, a state may simply
choose not to have a hate crime statute. 77 This is, however, a minority
approach, as forty-seven states have hate crime statutes independent of
the federal government. 78
Independence from the federal government gives states broad
latitude in choosing whom to include and exclude from their own hate
crime statutes. As a result, who is protected or excluded is completely
up to the state legislature’s discretion. For example, of the forty-seven
states that have hate crime statutes, all include race and religion as a

73. 18 U.S.C. § 249.
74. Simmons, supra note 57, at 1882.
75. Id.
76. Beale, supra note 68, at 1230–32.
77. Id.
78. See Rachel Sandler, Georgia Passes Hate Crime Law, Leaving Only Three States Without One, FORBES
(June, 26, 2020, 6:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2020/06/26/georgia-passes-hatecrime-law-leaving-only-three-states-without-one/?sh=aebad5a49095 [https://perma.cc/JLB9-ZDYY].
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protected category, while only thirty-one include sexual orientation,
and twenty-two include gender as protected categories. 79
B. Approaching Hate Crimes
State legislatures’ decisions on whom to include and exclude from
hate crime statutes have garnered broad attention and critique from
scholars. These critiques have typically centered around the federal
government’s potential violation of federalism principles, the utility or
usefulness of new hate crime legislation, or the appropriateness of the
restriction or expansion of state hate crime statutes. 80 Less has been
written, however, about the inclusion of law enforcement officers in
hate crime statutes. Scholarship in this area has either focused on one
particular state in its analysis, such as Louisiana, or has focused on
police inclusion at a theoretical level, noting why it is inappropriately
broad to include law enforcement officers in hate crime statutes. 81 Very
little scholarship in this area has considered the implications or the
possibility of an occupation utilizing racialization. This Article moves
away from focusing solely on whether a hate crime statute was
appropriately used or misused, to an approach that analyzes the context
in which particular statutes were passed along with the substantive
laws themselves.
I do this for multiple reasons. The first is because the misusage and
appropriateness frameworks presume that particular laws are not
acting in accordance with a particular design. 82 As Paul Butler suggests,
laws and policies that were ostensibly intended to protect minorities
have oftentimes worked to protect and serve interests counter to their
imagined purposes. 83 The second reason is that an approach that

79. See State Hate Crime Statutes, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 2, 2020) https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/state-hate-crimes-statutes [https://perma.cc
/QP3N-BJBS].
80. See Simmons, supra note 57, at 1892 (arguing that there needs to be more federal-state
collaboration in the prosecution of hate crimes); Beale, supra note 68, at 1269 (critiquing
unconstrained federal exercise of hate crime authority); James Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, Hate
Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 19–40 (1997) (arguing that both federal and state
legal mechanisms are inadequate to address actual prejudice-motivated crime).
81. See Lisa M. Olson, Blue Lives Have Always Mattered: The Usurping of Hate Crime Laws for an
Unintended and Unnecessary Purpose, 20 SCHOLAR 13, (2017); see also Savannah Walker, Policing Hate:
The Problematic Expansion of Louisiana’s Hate Crime Statute to Include Police Officers, 78 LA. L. REV. 1413
(2018).
82. Here, when referring to misuse or appropriateness frameworks, I am talking about
understandings that presume laws that result in inequality are somehow being misused or used
inappropriately. These understandings presume that the law is incompatible with inequality and
that decisionmakers’ motives do not intend to create unequal outcomes.
83. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It’s Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice
Reform, 2019 FREEDOM CTR. J. 75, 81–83 (2020).
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analyzes context and substance helps illuminate how hate crime
statutes protect those whom governments deem as worthy of
protections rather than those who are actually at risk.

C. The Blue-ing of Hate Crime Statutes
Since 2016, five states have enacted laws that provide hate crime
protection to law enforcement officers: Louisiana, Utah, Mississippi,
Texas, and Kentucky. 84 The first to enact such legislation was
Louisiana. 85 In Louisiana, “blue lives matter” legislation altered the
state’s hate crime statute to include a broad characterization of law
enforcement. 86 Louisiana’s statute is a sentencing enhancement hate
crime statute. 87 The addition of law enforcement here as a protected
category increases the penalty for crimes committed against a law
enforcement officer whereby the offender targeted law enforcement
and committed an enumerated felony or misdemeanor. 88
Under the statute, the law enforcement category includes
individuals who are targeted because of their actual or perceived status
as a member of law enforcement. 89 This means that an individual need
not necessarily be a law enforcement official, but the offender just
needs to perceive them to be a law enforcement official. The law
enforcement category therefore nets a wide range of individuals, even
those who may not actually be law enforcement officials.

84. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.14 (West 2019); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-305 (2018); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (West 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.031 (West 2017).
85. § 14:107.2; Walker, supra note 81, at 1415.
86. § 14:107.2. Under section E(3),
Law enforcement officer means any active or retired city, parish, or state law
enforcement officer, peace officer, sheriff, deputy sheriff, probation or parole
officer, marshal, deputy, wildlife enforcement agent, state correctional officer, or
commissioned agent of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, as well as
any federal law enforcement officer or employee, whose permanent duties include
making arrests, performing search and seizures, execution of criminal arrest
warrants, execution of civil seizure warrants, any civil functions performed by
sheriffs or deputy sheriffs, enforcement of penal or traffic laws, or the care, custody,
control, or supervision of inmates.
Id. This definition covers both active and retired officers, the latter of which may not be partaking
in police duties. Additionally, the repetitive usage of the word “any” casts a wide net of inclusion
per the rest of the statute’s designation.
87. MICHAEL SHIVELY, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., STUDY OF LITERATURE AND LEGISLATION ON HATE
CRIME IN AMERICA 1, 26–27 (2005).
88. Id.
89. § 14:107.2(A).
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The statutes in Texas, Utah, and Mississippi mirror the framework
in Louisiana. 90 They add law enforcement as a protected category while
providing sentence enhancement as a penalty for specified crimes
against law enforcement. 91 Utah and Mississippi also adopted the same
broad definition of law enforcement, encompassing both actual and
perceived status as a law enforcement official. 92 Furthermore, the Utah
and Mississippi statutes provide sentencing enhancements regardless
of whether actual or perceived law enforcement officials are targeted
because of their actual or perceived status when an enumerated felony
or misdemeanor crime is committed. 93
While inspired by Louisiana, Kentucky’s enactment varies slightly.
Kentucky’s framework allows judges to assess and weigh evidence
presented at trial. 94 If by a preponderance of evidence the judge
determines that a hate crime was the primary motivation for the
commission of an enumerated offense, then the judge enters the
finding into the record. 95 Once in the record, a sentencing judge can
use this finding “as the sole factor for denial of probation, shock
probation, conditional discharge, or other form of non-imposition of a
sentence of incarceration.” 96 Additionally, a parole board can use such a
finding to deny or delay probation. 97
Among states, there is slight variation with regard to what offenses
qualify as a hate crime offense. For example, in Mississippi and Utah,
the statute applies to any felony or misdemeanor. 98 In Louisiana and
Kentucky, though, only specified offenses fall under the statute. 99 This
means that in Mississippi and Utah, the hate crime statute can apply for
any offense, whereas in Louisiana and Kentucky the statute applies only
to enumerated offenses. 100
The blue frame became highly influential to legislators and
proponents of bills where law enforcement officers were ultimately
included in state hate crime statutory schemes. Legislators and
proponents applied this frame when specifically appealing to the
racialized “blue” identity. Louisiana state representative Lance Harris’s

90. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.14 (West 2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-305 (2018); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (West 2017).
91. § 76-3-203.14; § 99-19-305.
92. § 76-3-203.14; § 99-19-305.
93. § 76-3-203.14; § 99-19-305.
94. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031(2) (West 2017).
95. Id.
96. Id. at § 532.031(3).
97. Id. at § 532.031(4).
98. § 76-3-203.14; § 99-19-305.
99. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (2016); § 532.031.
100. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:107.2 (2016); § 532.031.
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comments to the media after his blue lives matter bill passed best
illustrates the blue frame:
“In the news, you see a lot of people terrorizing and threatening
police officers on social media just due to the fact that they are
policemen. Now, this (new law) protects police and firstresponders under the hate-crime law,” Harris said, adding that
he considers legislative action necessary because the crime is
“done strictly out of hate for the officer and his uniform.” 101
Speaking further, Harris stated that “[t]here is a concerted effort in
some areas to terrorize and attack police and I think this will go
forward and stop that.”102
Randy Sutton, a spokesman for blues lives matter, echoed this
sentiment. Sutton stated that blue lives matter laws are necessary
because police officers are akin to a minority group in need of
protection. 103 During an NPR interview, Chuck Canterbury, then
president of the Fraternal Order of Police, invoked the “blue” race frame
when stating that the primary reason for the push to include officers in
hate crime laws is that officers are “ambushed merely for the color of
their uniform.”104 Notedly, Canterbury wrote the first memo imploring
legislatures to incorporate law enforcement into hate crime statutes. 105
Speaking elsewhere, Canterbury stated:
Well for instance, in the Dallas case, it’s obvious that it fits
within the umbrella because the individual has made
statements to police that he wanted to kill white policemen.
Therefore, it’s race-based—and that’s why we’ve asked for a
change in the federal hate crime law. This case is specially . . . to
include law enforcement. 106

101. John Newsome & Carma Hassan, ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill Set for Louisiana Governor’s
Signature, CNN (May 20, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/20/us/louisiana-blue-livesmatter-legislation/index.html [https://perma.cc/JSW5-WBEU].
102. Kate Irby, Should Attacking Cops Be a Hate Crime?, TRI-CITY HERALD (May 24, 2016, 11:37
AM), https://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article79544922.html.
103. See Kevin Conlin, Louisiana Governor Signs ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill, CNN (May 27, 2016, 11:22 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/us/louisiana-blue-lives-matter-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/L73G5FQM].
104. Fraternal Order of Police President Calls Targeting of Officers a Hate Crime, Heard on All Things
Considered, NPR (July 8, 2016, 4:34 PM) [hereinafter All Things Considered] (emphasis added), https://
www.npr.org/2016/07/08/485281280/fraternal-order-of-police-president-calls-targeting-of-officers-ahate-crime [https://perma.cc/BE3N-U85M].
105. Letter from Chuck Canterbury, Nat’l Fraternal Order of Police President, to Barack H.
Obama II, President of the U.S. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://foplodge4.org/letter-from-national-foppresident-canterbury-to-president-obama/ [https://perma.cc/2GKN-5UNB].
106. All Things Considered, supra note 104.
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When Canterbury refers to race, he invokes the imagined racial
category of “blue.” It is not the white officers’ actual status as white
individuals that he refers to but to their status as “blue” officers. This is
the case because federal legislation already would have protected an
officer’s white racial identity. 107 Thus, there would be no need for new
legislation.
In this way, actions against officers are attacks against raced blue
lives, not just individuals in police uniforms. The movement and its
advocacy for these laws equate crimes against officers with crimes
against black individuals while simultaneously denying the legitimacy
of crimes against black individuals, especially those perpetrated by
police.
Proponents and legislatures also apply the blue framing of law
enforcement officers as oppressed, targeted victims. Legislators Phillip
Moran and Sean Tindell used this narrative to justify their introduction
of blue lives matter legislation:
“We want to send a message to everyone in America and the
whole world that if you come to Mississippi and you
intentionally assault, you try and kill or you unfortunately kill
an officer, you will receive the maximum penalty that we can
possibly issue to you.” 108
The Governor of Texas, Greg Abbot, relied on this frame in
characterizing the need to extend hate crime protections to law
enforcement in the state of Texas:
“At a time when law enforcement officers increasingly come
under assault simply because of the job they hold, Texas must
send a resolute message that the State will stand by the men
and women who serve and protect our communities.”109
In his State of the State address, the Governor of Mississippi made
clear his support for blue lives matter and the notion of the oppressed,
victimized officer:

107. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). An officer’s white racial identity would have been protected
under the statute as race is a statutorily-protected category. Therefore, if someone targeted an
officer based on their white racial identity, it would have a statutory home.
108. Mississippi Leaders Co-Author Police Hate Crime Bill, WLOX (July 30, 2016, 9:38 PM),
https://www.wlox.com/story/32579767/mississippi-leaders-co-author-police-hate-crime-bill
[https://perma.cc/T9BG-4BJJ].
109. Press Release, Off. of the Tex. Governor, Governor Abbott Announces Police Protection
Act (July 18, 2016) https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor_abbott_announces_police_protection
_act [https://perma.cc/K8VU-B2DV].
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The first and most important responsibility of any governor is
public safety, and across our nation, law enforcement is under
attack. Here in Mississippi, most of our citizens continue to
support and respect the men and women who wear the badge
and protect and serve. I appreciate the legislation you
[lawmakers] have introduced to protect law enforcement and
show the nation that here in Mississippi, blue lives matter. 110
Legislatures and proponents alike relied specifically on blue lives
matter’s blue frame, unmistakably evidenced by the way that the frame
next manifested itself. With the exception of Utah, the bills were either
named blue lives matter bills or blue lives matter was invoked in
reference to legislation by legislators and proponents. 111 In Mississippi,
Kentucky, and Louisiana, the bills were expressly named or referred to
as blue lives matter bills. 112 In Texas, blues lives matter was invoked in the
introduction of the act that would ultimately lead to the expansion of
the hate crime law to include law enforcement. 113
Perhaps most important, labeling the bills blue lives matter bills
anchored them within the blue frame even when legislatures attempted
to distance themselves from what they perceived to be the explicit
invocation of race or racial politics. Kevin Bratcher, the sponsor of the
Kentucky’s blue lives matter bill, attempted this distancing when
challenged by members of Black Lives Matter, who opposed the bill:
“This certainly has nothing to do with race, this is simply telling people
don’t attack our first responders for being first on a scene.” 114
Legislatures themselves need not explicitly use race to reflect back
to the blue frame. Merely labeling or referring to the bills as blue lives
matter bills engages with and endorses blue lives matters racial framing
that subverts and replaces black with blue. Invoking blue lives matter in

110. Arielle Dreher, Gov. Bryant: ‘Blue Lives Matter’ and ‘Sacred Cows’ Need to Go, JACKSON FREE
PRESS (Jan. 19, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2017/jan/19/gov-bryantblue-lives-matter-and-sacred-cows-need-/#h120078-p3 [https://perma.cc/X8SH-RJ4G].
111. See Jimmie Gate, Mississippi Senate Committee Passes Blue Lives Matter Bill, CLARION-LEDGER (Jan.
25, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/24/mississippi-bluelives-matter-bill/96987900/ [https://perma.cc/UU28-V3KS]; Ryland Barton, House Panel Approves ‘Blue
Lives Matter Bill,’ 89.3 WFPL NEWS LOUISVILLE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://wfpl.org/house-panel-approves-bluelives-matter-bill/ [https://perma.cc/H5FE-ERTN]; Greg Hilburn, Louisiana Governor Signs ‘Blue Lives
Matter’ Law, USA TODAY (May 26, 2016, 4:49 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now
/2016/05/26/louisiana-governor-signs-blue-lives-matter-law/84993144/ [https://perma.cc/K2PS-T57N];
see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-305 (2018); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.14 (West 2019).
112. Gate, supra note 111; Barton, supra note 111; Hilburn, supra note 111.
113. CRIM. PROC. art. 42.014.
114. Tabnie Dozier, Rally Planned Opposing ‘Blue Lives Matter Bill,’ WHAS11 (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:23
PM),
https://www.whas11.com/article/news/local/rally-planned-opposing-proposed-blue-livesmatter-bill/417-402754579 [https://perma.cc/VG2V-28PG].
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a title or in reference to the bill necessarily engages with the racialized
blue frame, as blue itself is a direct creation of the racialized frame.
IV. ASSESSING THE “BLUE” CLAIM
Distilling the quotes from proponents and legislators mentioned
thus far, the main purpose of including officers in hate crime statutes
can be boiled down to this rationale: Ensuring officer safety and
protecting officers from alleged increased violence directed at the
racialized officer. This begs the question: Are the claims emanating
from proponents of this racialized blue lives matter project warranted?
If they are, we should expect there to be evidence that it is unsafe to be
an officer and that officers face increased deadly violence when
compared to other occupations. My research and analysis find that such
evidence is overstated.
A. Methodology
To assess the blue lives matter bills proponents’ racialization
project, I analyzed data from the FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed
and Assaulted (LEOKA) database, which tracks deaths and assaults of
on-line duty officers. 115 I also analyzed data from the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Report (UCR). 116 I utilized national hate crime data collected by
the FBI to approximate the prevalence of hate crimes. With regard to
hate crimes, I limited the data to focus specifically on victimization
among black americans, as blue lives matter bills were launched in
response to black americans’ calls for police reform. I additionally used
the UCR to extract law enforcement employment statistics, as well as
national homicide statistics covering the period from 2010–2019 for
purposes of longitudinal comparative analysis. The last source of data I
used comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which collects data on
fatal occupational injury rates per occupation. 117
With this data, I constructed three proxy measures. The first is the
fatal occupational injury rate, as reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. This rate is equal to the total number of fatal injuries for a
given occupation and divided by the total number of hours worked by
115. See Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov
/services/cjis/ucr/leoka [https://perma.cc/E3RM-6Z48].
116. See Hate Crime Statistics, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/hate-crime [https://
perma.cc/HJ6L-3VWU].
117. See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) - Current, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.:
INJURIES, ILLNESSES, AND FATALITIES, https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm [https://perma.cc/PLV2BVQ8].
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all employees during the calendar year. 118 Using these rates, the relative
risk of fatal injury on the job for any occupation can be used for
comparative analysis. The second measure I used is the murder rate for
black americans and for law enforcement officers. To compute these
rates, I divided the number of homicides among a particular group by
the group population size and then multiplied by 100,000. The third
measure I used is the hate crime victimization rate for black americans
and law enforcement officers. To compute the hate crime victimization
rates, I divided the number of hate crime victims in a particular group
by the total population at risk in this group and then multiplied by
100,000.
1. Dangerousness Amongst Occupations
The fatal injury rates indicate that law enforcement is not among
the most dangerous professions in the U.S., despite the rationale given
for blue lives matter laws. Between the period of 2010 to 2019, law
enforcement consistently ranked outside of the ten most dangerous
professions for a given year. 119 During this same period, logging and
farming occupations have proven considerably more dangerous than
law enforcement. 120 In fact, since 2010, the fatal injury rate for law
enforcement officials has steadily declined, indicating that it has
become safer to be a law enforcement officer in the past decade.121
Moreover, in just the three years leading up to the enactment of the
first blue lives matter bill in 2016, the fatal injury rate for law
enforcement had been lower than in previous years, which is
inconsistent with claims by state legislatures and proponents that
officer safety was under threat during this period. 122
Although occupational injury rates give us some insight as to the
safety of different professions, it does not provide a complete picture.
While loggers or farmers may have a higher fatal injury rate than
officers, it seems fair to presume that law enforcement perhaps still
118. Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries – Hours-Based Rates, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://
www.bls.gov/iif/oshnotice10.htm [https://perma.cc/UGY4-8R5Q].
119. Id. (under the “Fatal Injury Rates” heading, select the spreadsheets labeled “Hours-based
fatal injury rates by industry, occupation, and selected demographic characteristics” for years 2018
and 2019); Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) – Archived Data, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoiarchive.htm#RATES [https://perma.cc/D7WZ-4M9S] (expand the
“Fatal Injury Rates” tab and select the spreadsheets labeled “Hours-based fatal injury rates by
industry, occupation, and selected demographic characteristics” for years 2010–2017).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. See generally Handbook of Methods, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries: Calculation, U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/cfoi/calculation.htm [https://perma.cc
/XTC8-TC7A] (explaining calculation and methodology of fatal injury rate).
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may encounter more danger in their day-to-day interactions.
Additionally, it would seem that the nature of these dangers is also
different. For example, the dangers that loggers and farmers encounter
likely come from equipment and machinery accidents. When state
legislatures and blue lives matter activists emphasize threats to the
safety of officers, they likely have in mind bias-motivated, targeted
crimes such as homicide, which seems an unlikely occupational risk in
most other professions, even if they are otherwise dangerous. 123
2. Likelihood of Being Murdered
The next inquiry I made into law enforcement safety was to
determine the relative risk of being murdered. As noted above, key to
blue lives matter messaging was the idea that it is far more dangerous
to be a law enforcement officer than it is to be a black american. 124 One
way to test this claim is to determine the relative risk to each group of
becoming the victim of homicide. Figures 1 and 2 display the relative
risk of homicide for law enforcement and black americans in the
population. These figures show a starkly different story from the large
increase in murders of officers claimed by blue lives matter spokesman
Randy Sutton. 125 In 2015, law enforcement recorded the safest year on
record for the occupation. 126
The data complicate the notion, at least as it pertains to homicide,
that being an officer is more dangerous than merely being black in
america. Across all years considered here, the homicide rate for black
americans far outpaces the homicide rate for law enforcement officers.
It is remarkable that, despite having no professional responsibility to be
proximate to violence, black americans as a whole suffer a higher risk of
being the victim of a homicide than police. In essence, it is safer in the
United States to be a law enforcement officer than it is to be a black
american.

123. See supra notes 101, 105, 109.
124. See sources cited supra note 49.
125. Elizabeth Llorente, Blue Lives Lost: Dramatic Rise in Police Officers Gunned down in Line of Duty
in 2016, FOX NEWS (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/us/blue-lives-lost-dramatic-rise-inpolice-officers-gunned-down-in-line-of-duty-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/WXS3-HEYD].
126. Matt Ferner, FBI Confirms 2015 Was One of the Safest Years Ever for Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17,
2016, 6:26 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fbi-police-deaths_n_573b53aae4b0646cbeeb02b8 [https://
perma.cc/H9ND-MEE6]; German Lopez, Killings of Police Officers on Duty Are near Record Lows, VOX (Nov. 14,
2018, 4:11 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938238/police-officer-on-duty-deaths-killings
[https://perma.cc/KE8L-FJF2]. As of this writing, 2018 is the most recent year for which data is available.
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FIGURE 1. COMPARING OFFICER HOMICIDE VICTIM RATES (SEE INFRA TABLE
1) WITH BLACK HOMICIDE VICTIM RATES (SEE INFRA TABLE 2)

Homicides (per 100,000)

20

16

12

.
41

8

.•.

♦

♦

~

•

•

.

~

.
... . . ·~

•♦....

....

...

••

....

.

. . ...
•

•

•

!.I.•·

.

2017

2018

•

..

••••••••

♦

....

•••

••• ••
~

4
2010

2011

2012

2013

black homicide victims

2014

2015

2016

...... officer homicide victims

2019

164

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:1

TABLE 1. LAW ENFORCEMENT ON-DUTY HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION RATE
Year Victimization Count127 Officer Population
2010 128
2011 129
2012 130
2013131
2014132
2015 133
2016 134
2017 135
2018 136
2019 137

55
72
49
27
51
41
66
46
56
48

705,009
698,460
670,439
626,942
627,949
635,781
652,936
670,279
686,665
697,195

Rate (Per
100,000)
7.8
10.3
7.3
4.3
8.1
6.4
10.1
6.9
8.1
6.8

127. Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed, Race, Ethnicity, and Sex of Victim Officer, 2010–2019,
FBI, tbl.15, https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2019/topic-pages/tables/table-15.xls [https://perma.cc/W8U9LZEZ.
128. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2010, FBI, tbl.74,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl74.xls/view [https://
perma.cc/YGQ6-6PXW].
129. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2011, FBI,
tbl.74, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table_74_full-time_
law_enforcement_employees_by_population_group_percent_male_and_female_2011.xls [https://
perma.cc/69D6-E2FQ].
130. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2012, FBI, tbl.74, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/74tabledatadecoverviewpdfs/table_74_full_time_
law_enforcement_employees_by_population_group_percent_male_and_female_2012.xls [https://perma.cc
/63HJ-H54T].
131. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2013, FBI, tbl.74,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-74/table_74_full_time_law_
enforcement_employees_by_population_group_percent_male_and_female_2013.xls [https://perma.cc
/C7WU-S5UE].
132. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2014, FBI, tbl.74,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-74
[https://perma.cc/2EFJKDWZ].
133. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2015, FBI, tbl.74,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-74 [https://perma.cc/Y3XZM926].
134. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2016, FBI,
tbl.74, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-25/
[https://perma.cc/MG4W-MGVR].
135. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2017, FBI,
tbl.74, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/tables/table-74
[https://perma.cc/53A7-GJTS].
136. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2018, FBI,
tbl.74, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-74
[https://perma.cc/XW6K-WQM3].
137. Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by Population Group, Percent Male and Female, 2019, FBI,
tbl.74, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/tables/table-74
[https://perma.cc/4KYJ-PMEH].
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TABLE 2. TOTAL BLACK HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION RATE
Year Victimization Count black Population 138 Rate (Per 100,000)
6,470
43,347,645
14.93
2010 139
2011 140
6,329
43,898,857
14.41
2012 141
6,454
44,464,891
14.51
6,261
45,017,720
13.90
2013142
2014143
6,095
45,586,479
13.87
2015 144
7,039
46,162,127
15.25
7,881
46,733,758
16.86
2016 145
146
2017
7,851
47,268,586
16.61
2018 147
7,407
47,754,210
15.51
7,484
48,221,139
15.51
2019 148
3. Are Officers Targeted for Being Officers?
The traditional purpose of hate crime statutes has been to prevent
and penalize crime that singles out and targets individuals based on
their membership in a particular subgroup of the population such as

138. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Age, Race Alone or in Combination, and
Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 (NC-EST2019-ASR5H), CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATION DIV. (June 2020), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/20102019/national/asrh/nc-est2019-asr5h.xlsx [hereinafter Annual Estimates of the Resident Population].
139. Murder Victims by Race and Sex, 2010, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crimein-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl01.xls [https://perma.cc/H7AF-3ZUU].
140. Murder Victims by Race and Sex, 2011, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crimein-the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-1 [https://perma.cc/X4Y5-4KA5].
141. Murder Victims by Race and Sex, 2012, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-theu.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_1
_murder_victims_by_race_and_sex_2012.xls [https://perma.cc/C74Q-4ZZR].
142. Murder Victims by Race and Sex, 2013, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-theu.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_1
_murder_victims_by_race_and_sex_2013.xls [https://perma.cc/Y78V-E8JJ].
143. Murder Victims by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2014, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s
/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/expanded-homicide-data/expanded_homicide_data_table
_1_murder_victims_by_race_ethnicity_and_sex_2014.xls [https://perma.cc/HZ3H-SJBR].
144. Murder Victims by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2015, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/expanded_homicide_data_table_1_murder_victims_by_race_ethnicity_and
_sex_2015.xls [https://perma.cc/U8R4-9KTC].
145. Murder Victims by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2016, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/JP62-6G69].
146. Murder Victims by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2017, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-1.xls
[https://perma.cc/LSF7R7M3].
147. Murder Victims by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2018, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-inthe-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/F8RJ-V98K].
148. Murder Victims by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2019, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s
/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-1.xls [https://
perma.cc/TE57-QJZP].
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race, religion, sexuality, and so on. 149 A key justification for the move to
include law enforcement within hate crime statutes was that officers
were increasingly targeted based on their membership in law
enforcement, much like how a black person might be targeted because
they are part of a subordinate racial group.
Based on this claim, we might expect that the inclusion of law
enforcement officers in hate crime statutes would yield similar, or
perhaps even higher, rates of offenses against this group when
compared with already-protected categories.
Table 3 shows the risk of hate crime victimization for black
individuals between 2010–2019. Table 4 shows the risk of victimization
for all raced individuals over the same time period. Because law
enforcement was included in hate crimes statutes beginning in 2016,
the only applicable period for comparison is 2016–2019. Table 5 shows
the hate crime victimization rates among law enforcement for the
period 2016–2019 in the states where such statutes were enacted.

Hate Crimes (per 100,000)

FIGURE 2. COMPARISON OF HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION RATES FOR BLACK
INDIVIDUALS (SEE INFRA TABLE 3), ALL RACIALIZED INDIVIDUALS (SEE INFRA
TABLE 4), AND OFFICERS (SEE INFRA TABLE 5)
7
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149.

See Simmons, supra note 57.
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TABLE 3. BLACK HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION RATE 150
Year

Victimization
Count

Total
Population 151

Rate (Per
100,000)

2010 152
2011 153
2012 154
2013155
2014156
2015 157
2016 158
2017 159
2018 160
2019 161

2,765
2,619
2,295
2,371
2,022
2,201
2,220
2,458
2,426
2,391

43,347,645
43,898,857
44,464,891
45,017,720
45,586,479
46,162,127
46,733,758
47,268,586
47,754,210
48,221,139

6.4
6
5.2
5.3
4.4
4.8
4.8
5.2
5.1
5

150. See supra Section IV.A (discussing methodology for compilation of UCR data).
151. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population, supra note 138.
152. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2010, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2010/tables/table-1-incidents-offenses-victims-and-known-offenders-bybias-motivation-2010.xls [https://perma.cc/5DLC-PL6L].
153. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2011, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2011/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/FNS7-CRXQ].
154. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2012, FBI, tbl.1, https://ucr.fbi.gov
/hate-crime/2012/tables-and-data-declarations/1tabledatadecpdf/table_1_incidents_offenses_victims_and
_known_offenders_by_bias_motivation_2012.xls [https://perma.cc/7AUG-25R5].
155. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2013, FBI, tbl.1, https://ucr.fbi.gov
/hate-crime/2013/tables/1tabledatadecpdf/table_1_incidents_offenses_victims_and_known_offenders
_by_bias_motivation_2013.xls [https://perma.cc/R8KM-KXR9].
156. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2014, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2014/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/C3UR-VVCB].
157. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2015, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/tables-and-data-declarations/1tabledatadecpdf [https://perma.cc/WH4JP4BM].
158. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2016, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/WNH5-8TRD].
159. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2017, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/TL4L-N94D].
160. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2018, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018/topic-pages/tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/88BJ-2YLE].
161. Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2019, FBI, tbl.1, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2019/topic-pages/tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/YH5J-L8RK].
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TABLE 4. TOTAL RACIAL HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION RATE 162

Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Racial Hate
Crime
Victimization
Count 163
3,949
3,645
3,467
3,563
3,227
4,216
4,426
5,060
5,155
4,930

Total
Population 164

Victimization
Rate (Per
100,000)

309,321,666
311,556,874
313,830,990
315,993,715
318,301,008
320,635,163
322,941,311
324,985,539
326,687,501
328,239,523

1.3
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.3
1.4
1.6
1.6
1.5

TABLE 5. OFFICER HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION RATE 165
Year

Officer Hate Crime
Victimization
Count 166

Total Officer
Population 167

Victimization
Rate

2016
2017
2018
2019

0
0
0
0

652,936
670,279
686,665
697,195

0
0
0
0

As of yet, there have been no prosecutions or recordings of hate
crimes committed against law enforcement since the passage of blue
lives matter laws or since law enforcement has been protected under
hate crime statutes. Thus, to claim the laws are about safety or
protection puts law enforcement and blue lives matter proponents in a
precarious position. Not enforcing the law indicates two potential
explanations: First, there are no hate crimes committed against
officers, in which case, one would have to question the purpose of

162. See supra Section IV.A (discussing methodology for compilation of UCR data).
163. See sources cited supra notes 152–61.
164. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: April
1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 (NC-EST2019-SR11H), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIV. (June 2020), https://
www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2019/national/asrh/nc-est2019-sr11h.xlsx.
165. See supra Section IV.A (discussing methodology for compilation of UCR data).
166. Victimization counts correspond to zero because no reported incidents have occurred.
This data is not even included in the current UCR reports.
167. See sources cited supra notes 134–37.
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including law enforcement in such laws in the first place. Second,
including law enforcement under hate crime statutes doesn’t appear to
recognize any tangible threat to the extent that alleged offenders are
committing hate crimes against officers. The most defensible
conclusion is that lawmakers incorporated law enforcement officers
under hate crime statutes not because officers were frequently targets
of bias-motivated crimes, as were other protected categories, but as a
symbolic change meant to show political support to officers and the
blue lives matter movement, while at the same time indicating
opposition to Black Lives Matter.
B. Discussion
Hate crime statutes have come a long way from being constructed
primarily to protect black americans from the intense violence they
faced from law enforcement and hostile parties during the Civil Rights
Era. Today, at least in five states, law enforcement officers are now
included in the same statutes that were meant to protect against law
enforcement’s abuse of power. As shown above, these laws are rooted in
false racialized narratives about officer safety. In fact, these data reflect
that perhaps more resources and effort need to be put into protecting
the lives of black americans. With so much of blue lives matter’s own
messaging about Black Lives Matter focused on denying the
importance of race, it is peculiar that blue lives matter itself relies very
heavily on a racial logic in its attempt to construct officers as a status
group in need of protection. The co-optation of oppressed racialized
status by law enforcement indicates that non-racialized groups are
willing to adopt racialized identities to both deflect and garner legal
and political support.
Though I have argued that there are insufficient data to support the
conclusion that officers have faced increased danger, I acknowledge
that alternative explanations might explain the void of data. It could
very well be the case that such offenses that would fall under the
jurisdiction of hate crimes are being prosecuted under one of many
overlapping laws, or that prosecutors are confused about which law to
bring charges under. Alternatively, if it is the case that offenses are
being prosecuted under preexisting law, it would then support the
conclusion that protecting law enforcement under hate crime laws
serves no substantive purpose.
I posit that these laws should be viewed as attempting to punish
Black Lives Matter, protestors of law enforcement, and for that matter,
anyone who interacts with police. As a result of this codification,
actions taken during protests against police brutality now carry with
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them harsher penalties which can be exercised legally whenever the
state deems fit. For example, in Louisiana, disturbing the peace is a
misdemeanor and is within the scope of the state’s hate crime statute. 168
Examples of disturbing the peace including blocking access to public
buildings, engaging in tumultuous activity by any three persons,
appearing (not actually being) intoxicated, holding an unlawful
assembly, and using offensive, derisive, or annoying words directed at
someone in public. 169 It is not difficult to imagine how popular protest
actions such as die-ins or spirited chants directed at law enforcement
could fall within the scope of misdemeanors. Furthermore, charges of
unlawful assemblies are already a tactic used by law enforcement to
disperse protests. 170 Showing up to a protest against police brutality in
Louisiana that gets declared an unlawful assembly essentially assures
that one is committing a hate crime under the state’s statute.
It is alarming that powerful state actors can harness narratives of
the oppressed and effectuate change that serves to give more power to
police. This will only further stifle actual victims of inequity at the
hands of law enforcement. Though dormant now, there should not be
comfort knowing that the laws have not been used. It should be
unsettling that speaking out and taking action during protests against
police brutality now carry harsher penalties, which can be exercised
legally whenever the state deems fit. Legislation that was birthed in a
context that meant to protect black americans from violence, some of
which they faced at the hands of police during the Civil Rights
movement, has evolved to provide the very same protections to police.
As this Article shows, the move to include law enforcement in hate
crime statutes was not about a need to protect law enforcement but
rather was a response to increased calls for the end of racist policing
practices. As such, there is no need for law enforcement to be protected
under hate crime statues, and they should be removed from hate crime
statutes as protected victims.
I find most persuasive the idea that blue lives matter laws were
never about officer safety and were always intended to be gestures of
support for law enforcement. These laws represent legislatures’
agreement that officers are indeed under attack, and black lives are not,
despite data to the contrary. The codification of these laws is not simply
just about the passage of a law—it is a move that ideologically aligns
legal mechanisms with particularized discourses that privilege law
enforcement to the detriment of racialized minorities who seek to hold
168. LA STAT. ANN. § 14:103 (2017).
169. Id. at § 14:103A(2) – (4).
170. See Andrew Selsky, Police ‘Unlawful Assembly’ Powers Come Under Fire in Oregon, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 9, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-law-enforcement-agencies-oregon-racialinjustice-portland-2ce8379ec07e812e74e055e4be1c3ad5 [https://perma.cc/38QQ-92UG].
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law enforcement accountable. Moreover, these laws show that it did not
matter whether law enforcement was actually under attack or if laws
could protect them; rather, what mattered more to legislatures was
signaling their support for law enforcement.
There is perhaps a silver lining for race scholars and those who
mobilize movements around race. Blue lives matter’s usage of a racial
frame highlights how legislators and law enforcement are not opposed
to racial framings and unwilling to deal with race. Rather, the move to
include law enforcement under hate crime statutes actually shows a
willingness and a capacity to accept and engage with racial concepts.
There was no fragility or attempt by law enforcement or legislators to
distance themselves from the blue frame because of the “race card” or
its focus on widespread accusations of oppression at the hands of
others. This shows that the decision of when to recognize racial
oppression by legislators and law enforcement is selective, contingent,
and intentional. Race and racial framings in this way remain a powerful
and persuasive way to spark change. Perhaps this moment teaches us
that the lack of progress toward dismantling race and racism in the U.S.
is not about scholars and movements focusing on race, but simply put,
racism itself.
For legal scholars, and specifically hate crime scholars, the
inclusion of law enforcement under hate crime statutes signals that
hate crime statutes are perhaps less potent without boundaries.
Specifically, hate crime laws need to be reserved to protect those most
vulnerable and oppressed in society. The malleable applicability within
hate crime statutes makes it possible for law enforcement to be
included as a category despite not being amongst the envisioned group
of individuals to be protected by initial or subsequent hate crime
enactments. Wide latitude at both the state and federal level allows
protected categories to expand, not based on need, but whenever
legislatures deem it appropriate. For states specifically, the lack of
restriction means that states are not limited or constrained to
protecting only categories or groups that inspired the need for hate
crime legislation, or groups that experience high incidences of targeted
victimization based on a group they belong to. In essence, there is no
threshold for inclusion or exclusion as a protected category that states
must follow. There is a disservice done to those who face very real
religious, racial, gendered, and homophobic persecution when entities
like law enforcement are included in hate crime statutes despite facing
relatively little, if any persecution. It is a disservice to the asians
targeted based on their race throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, to the
LGBTQ folx who are murdered every year based on their gender
identities and sexualities, to the immigrants targeted because they are
from the “wrong place,” to the Muslim americans who had their places
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of worship burned down, to the many black amercians who have died
from white supremacist violence simply because they were black. All
whom have a demonstrable need rooted in actual oppression.
Lastly, the move by blue lives matter bill proponents to racialize an
occupation shows us that we need to explore nontraditional contexts
where racialization might be occurring. As shown here, racialization
proved a vital tool for proponents, despite most commentary
surrounding such bills failing to mention race or racialization as
strategy used by proponents. In the long run, the move to expand hate
crime statutes to include law enforcement hurts officer and community
relations. The many marginalized groups who have been demonstrably
oppressed and who lack legal protections could understandably feel
slighted that law enforcement, with no demonstrable oppression, is
protected at a legal level above or equivalent to them. It might be even
more frustrating, given the deployment of racialized narratives, that
suddenly the efforts that law enforcement make to garner legal
protections are embraced, but categorically dismissed when used by
actually oppressed groups. It certainly could be possible to advocate for
law enforcement change or call attention to problems officers face
without pitting blue racing against credible calls to action for
vulnerable groups. Doing so pits already constrained law enforcement
actors against the very communities they are supposed to be serving. To
the extent that policy makers and law enforcement officials who see
policing as an integral part of society and want to promote better
community relations, perhaps a better advocacy strategy to adopt is one
that does not see police accountability and critique as a zero-sum to
police quality.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this Article, I show that the emergence of blue lives
matter bills occurred as a result of blue racing—the process of
racializing law enforcement. The racialized “blue frame” arose out of a
context which sought to displace and replace law enforcement critics’,
specifically Black Lives Matter’s, claims of abuse and victimization.
Increased scrutiny and accusations of racism from Black Lives Matter
and protestors have seemingly made blue lives matter and law
enforcement adopt a reactive strategy that characterizes officers as
racialized victims, instead of engaging with Black Lives Matter claims
in a productive way. Contrary to the blue frame, data reflect that law
enforcement has not actually experienced increased violence and
victimization, despite the central claims of proponents’ racialization
project.
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What has resulted is a statutory framework that can be wielded
against protestors of police brutality at protests and has strengthened
protections for law enforcement. The real-life implications of
expanding hate crime statutes to include law enforcement can prove to
be quite devastating. Intentional or not, the result of the move to
include law enforcement under hate crime legislation has produced a
regime where almost any interaction with law enforcement could be
considered a hate crime. Hate crime laws are so broad that innocuous
actions taken during a protest for police reform, those which Black
Lives Matter is popular for, where police are present, could now be
considered a hate crime.

